Abstract:

In this paper, a game analysis of “private-public” mixed road network charges was performed. A model was established to theoretically deduce and prove the existence and nature of an equilibrium solution of game analysis of the charges of private-public enterprises for a parallel road network controlled by them. Additionally, the influence of different game models on social welfare, charge, traffic, etc. was compared. In the oligarch game, the highest fee will be charged for each road section, resulting in the lowest total travel flow and social welfare; in the social optimal welfare game, the lowest fee will be charged for each road section, but the total travel flow and social welfare will be the highest; in the mixed game, the fee, total travel flow and social welfare will lie between those of the other two games. Finally, the efficiency of different game models was discussed when all the road sections in a parallel network are symmetrical.

Key words: “private public” hybrid road network, game model, equilibrium, pricing