上海大学学报(自然科学版) ›› 2023, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (3): 407-.doi: 10.12066/j.issn.1007-2861.2489

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绿色信贷下供应链低碳策略的演化博弈分析——碳减排挂钩贷款视角

李 婷, 李远勤   

  1. (上海大学 管理学院, 上海 200444)
  • 出版日期:2023-06-30 发布日期:2023-07-12
  • 通讯作者: 李远勤 (1973—), 女, 教授, 博士生导师, 研究方向为公司财务、公司治理等. E-mail:yuanqin.li@shu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金面上资助项目 (72172088)

Evolutionary game analysis of supply chain low-carbon strategy under green credit: perspective of carbon emission reduction linked loan

LI Ting, LI Yuanqin   

  1. (School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China)
  • Online:2023-06-30 Published:2023-07-12

摘要: 绿色信贷作为构建绿色低碳供应链的助推器, 将贷款利率与企业碳减排量挂钩, 是加速绿色由浅入深的有效工具. 本工作构建了静态 Stackelberg 均衡和动态演化博弈联动模型,并探讨各参与方的低碳策略和影响因素. 研究结果表明, 碳减排挂钩贷款能够强化制造商和零售商的减排努力, 增加企业利润; 零售商“漂绿” 行为短期可以增加制造商和零售商的利润, 但长期不是最优策略; 消费者绿色消费偏好、宣传和推广碳减排挂钩贷款、适当放宽贷款优惠比例、提高银行数字化水平, 能够促进供应链和银行的低碳行为.

关键词: 绿色低碳供应链, 绿色信贷, 碳减排挂钩贷款, 演化博弈

Abstract: As a booster for building a green and low-carbon supply chain, green credit is an effective tool to accelerate green development by linking the loan interest rate with the corporate carbon emission reduction. A static Stackelberg equilibrium and dynamic three-party evolutionary game linkage model was built, and the low-carbon strategies and influencing factors of each participant were investigated. The results reveal that carbon emission reduction linked loans can strengthen the emission reduction efforts of manufacturers and retailers, and also increase corporate profits. Retailers’ ‘green bleaching’ behaviour can increase manufacturers’ and retailers’ profits in the short term, but it is not the optimal strategy in the long term. Consumers’ green consumption preferences, publicity and promotion of the aforementioned loans, appropriate relaxation of the loan preference ratio, and improvement of the digital level of banks can promote the low-carbon behaviour of supply chains and banks.

Key words: green and low-carbon supply chain, green credit, carbon emission reduction linked loan, evolutionary game

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