Journal of Shanghai University(Natural Science Edition) ›› 2023, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (3): 407-.doi: 10.12066/j.issn.1007-2861.2489
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LI Ting, LI Yuanqin
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Published:
Abstract: As a booster for building a green and low-carbon supply chain, green credit is an effective tool to accelerate green development by linking the loan interest rate with the corporate carbon emission reduction. A static Stackelberg equilibrium and dynamic three-party evolutionary game linkage model was built, and the low-carbon strategies and influencing factors of each participant were investigated. The results reveal that carbon emission reduction linked loans can strengthen the emission reduction efforts of manufacturers and retailers, and also increase corporate profits. Retailers’ ‘green bleaching’ behaviour can increase manufacturers’ and retailers’ profits in the short term, but it is not the optimal strategy in the long term. Consumers’ green consumption preferences, publicity and promotion of the aforementioned loans, appropriate relaxation of the loan preference ratio, and improvement of the digital level of banks can promote the low-carbon behaviour of supply chains and banks.
Key words: green and low-carbon supply chain, green credit, carbon emission reduction linked loan, evolutionary game
CLC Number:
F 274
F 832.4
LI Ting, LI Yuanqin. Evolutionary game analysis of supply chain low-carbon strategy under green credit: perspective of carbon emission reduction linked loan[J]. Journal of Shanghai University(Natural Science Edition), 2023, 29(3): 407-.
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URL: https://www.journal.shu.edu.cn/EN/10.12066/j.issn.1007-2861.2489
https://www.journal.shu.edu.cn/EN/Y2023/V29/I3/407