Journal of Shanghai University(Natural Science Edition) ›› 2021, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (4): 803-814.doi: 10.12066/j.issn.1007-2861.2178

• Research Articles • Previous Articles    

Evolutionary game analysis and control of public opinions during emergencies under different stages of communication and limited rationality

LI Mingkun(), LI Hui, HE Hailong, GE Yibo   

  1. School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China
  • Received:2019-07-20 Online:2021-08-20 Published:2021-07-22
  • Contact: LI Mingkun E-mail:limingkun@126.com

Abstract:

Public opinion during emergencies has a great deal of impact on social stability and development. Hence, the government focuses on methods of controlling public opinion, using methods that can solve a problem in its infancy. This paper used the evolutionary game method and introduced the punishment game model, wherein the government punished public opinion, and the incentive game model, wherein the government provided positive news on emergencies so as to deduce the evolutionary direction of the behavior of public groups. The results showed that during the early stages of public opinion communication, increasing punishment or positive publicity by government departments would increase the punishment cost of public opinion communication, or increase the psychological benefits of public opinion non-communication, so as to further achieve the goal of controlling public opinion. This paper analyzed the characteristics of different development stages of emergencies by analyzing the “Kunshan anti-killing” and Shandong “insulting mother and killing” cases. It put forward suggestions for decision-making for the government to control public opinion during emergencies.

Key words: emergencies, dissemination of public opinion, punishment game, incentive game

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