上海大学学报(自然科学版)

• 数理化科学 • 上一篇    

供应链企业间信任建立的信号博弈

林英晖   

  1. 上海大学 国际工商与管理学院,上海 201800
  • 收稿日期:2006-06-20 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2007-04-30 发布日期:2007-04-30
  • 通讯作者: 林英晖

Signal Game in Establishing Trust between Enterprises in a Supply Chain

LIN Ying-hui   

  1. School of International Business and Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 201800, China
  • Received:2006-06-20 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2007-04-30 Published:2007-04-30
  • Contact: LIN Ying-hui

摘要: 将著名的“二手车”单价模型应用到供应链企业间信任建立的博弈分析中,分析结果表明,分开均衡情况下的供应商可信度最高.为了实现分开均衡,应增大不可信供应商加盟供应链的成本,而这需要通过社会制度的完善才能实现.

关键词: 供应链, 企业间信任, 信号博弈, 信任建立

Abstract: Based on the famous game model of “second-hand bicycles", this paper analyzes the trust between enterprises within a supply chain. The result shows that separated equilibrium has the highest degree of trust. In order to realize the separated equilibrium, cost for entering the supply chain must be increased and the social system should be improved.

Key words: establishment of trust, inter-enterprise trust, signal game, supply chain

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