Online freight platforms have been directly or indirectly involved in assisting the regulation of small and micro transportation capacity enterprises (SMTCEs) financing transactions. However, when choosing regulation strategies, these platforms must weigh the costs and benefits of adopting digital trust regulation methods versus traditional logistics regulation methods. Based on evolutionary game theory, this thesis statement utilizes dynamic game theory model testing correlations between online freight platforms and SMTCEs to analyze the influence of the financing regulation strategy, chosen by the platforms, on SMTCEs' credit risks. The research shows that digital trust regulation methods can help lower SMTCEs' default rates. When SMTCEs' financing cost is lower than the sum of compliance incentives and default penalties under the digital trust regulation, credit risks of financing can be mitigated effectively. In addition, bank incentives are considered in the game model for further discussion of the platform's choice of regulation strategy, and some recommendations are provided for banks to choose partners in loan cooperation.