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Promoting mechanism in college students' innovative undertaking based on evolutionary game
Received date: 2017-10-10
Online published: 2019-10-31
Governments and universities are two important stakeholders in the process of college students' innovative undertaking. Under the condition of information asymmetry and bounded rationality, the model of governments, universities and college students is constructed based on the evolutionary game. The model studies choices of the three stakeholders in the process of college students' innovative undertaking. The evolutionary equilibrium strategy of the model with different parameters is demonstrated using the Matlab software. The research results show if the government wishes to promote college students' innovative undertaking, large investment alone is not enough. It must take into account the efficiency of college students' innovative undertaking and set to mobilize the enthusiasm of all parties involved. The university, as the main body in education, also has its own role to play in the trio-relationship, which is, to set clear responsibilities for different parties and improve in spection and supervision mechanism. On the part of the students, it is obvious that the greater the number of the college students who involve themselves in innovation and entrepreneurship, the more conducive to the formation of innovative and entrepreneurial mechanism.
Yang HUANGFU, Liying YU . Promoting mechanism in college students' innovative undertaking based on evolutionary game[J]. Journal of Shanghai University, 2019 , 25(5) : 826 -835 . DOI: 10.12066/j.issn.1007-2861.1986
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