研究论文

政产学研合作背景下的专利共享机制——基于材料基因组工程研究的分析

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  • 上海大学 管理学院, 上海 200444

收稿日期: 2017-03-29

  网络出版日期: 2018-10-26

基金资助

国家自然科学基金资助项目(71372187);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172217);上海市科委基金资助项目(14DZ2261200);上海市科委基金资助项目(15DZ2260300)

Mechanism of patent sharing with government-production-university-institute-application integration: an analysis based on the research of materials genome engineering

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  • School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China

Received date: 2017-03-29

  Online published: 2018-10-26

摘要

材料基因组工程(materials genome engineering)是一项对国民经济影响巨大、持续运行的研究项目, 对于其知识产权的保护问题会影响到项目的成败. 从利益动机出发建立了博弈模型, 分析了合同内专利许可、建立专利联盟等情况下收益的变化; 并针对材料基因组工程专利保护的特性, 从可持续发展的角度提出了专利共享机制的建设理念. 最后, 以理论分析结果为基础, 提出了政产学研合作背景下, 材料基因组工程研究的知识产权共享及利益分配机制的构建策略.

本文引用格式

刘艳, 范小军 . 政产学研合作背景下的专利共享机制——基于材料基因组工程研究的分析[J]. 上海大学学报(自然科学版), 2018 , 24(5) : 829 -840 . DOI: 10.12066/j.issn.1007-2861.1910

Abstract

Research of materials genome engineering is a continuously operating project with an important impact on the national economy. Protection of intellectual property is the guarantee of the project's success. Based on the motivation of interest, this paper establishes a game model to analyze variation of the revue under the patent license within and outside the contract. In view of the perspective of sustainable development, a concept of patent sharing is proposed to comply with intellectual property protection of materials genome engineering. Based on a theoretical analysis, the paper proposes a construction strategy of patent sharing mechanism of materials genome engineering with integration of government, production, university, institute, and application.

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