为减少温室气体排放, 鼓励发展可再生能源, 许多国家推行了多种新能源扶持政策, 如可再生能源发电上网价格补贴(feed-in tariff, FIT) 政策和可交易绿色证书(tradable green certificate, TGC) 政策等, 用以完成绿色能源发电的配额要求. 为了研究不同的新能源扶持政策对寡头竞争电力市场的影响, 采用古诺竞争均衡理论分别建立了考虑FIT 和TGC 两种政策的电力市场竞争均衡模型, 并采用两层优化结构实现了市场管理者通过调控补贴价格或证书价格来追求社会福利的最大化. 通过仿真分析比较了两种政策对电力市场的影响, 得到了具有实际指导意义的结论. 该研究有助于可再生能源扶持政策的科学制定.
Development of clean and renewable energy is encouraged around the world to reduce greenhouse gas emission. With the implementation of support policies such as feedin tariff (FIT) and tradable green certificate (TGC), the mandatory quota of renewable energy must be fulfilled. This study examines how the two policies affect the oligopolistic electricity markets. Using the equilibrium theory of Cournot competition, equilibrium models for electricity market considering FIT and TGC policies are established respectively. The market regulator can regulate the price of subsidy or TGC using a bi-level optimization
model to maximize social welfare. Impacts of the two policies on the electricity markets are analyzed and compared in numerical simulation. Practically meaningful results are obtained.
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