网络货运平台承担了小微运力企业的融资监管, 但在融资监管策略的选择上会权衡数字信任监管与传统物流监管的成本与收益. 基于演化博弈理论, 构建了网络货运平台与小微运力企业的动态博弈模型, 探讨平台融资监管策略的选择对小微运力企业融资信用风险的影响. 研究结果显示, 数字信任监管能够促进小微运力企业守约, 当小微运力企业的融资成本低于数字信任监管为其带来的守约激励与违约惩罚之和时, 融资的信用风险能够被有效抑制. 同时, 在博弈中还引入了银行激励, 进一步讨论了平台的监管策略选择问题, 并为银行选择贷款合作伙伴提出了建议.

Online freight platforms have been directly or indirectly involved in assisting the regulation of small and micro transportation capacity enterprises (SMTCEs) financing transactions. However, when choosing regulation strategies, these platforms must weigh the costs and benefits of adopting digital trust regulation methods versus traditional logistics regulation methods. Based on evolutionary game theory, this thesis statement utilizes dynamic game theory model testing correlations between online freight platforms and SMTCEs to analyze the influence of the financing regulation strategy, chosen by the platforms, on SMTCEs' credit risks. The research shows that digital trust regulation methods can help lower SMTCEs' default rates. When SMTCEs' financing cost is lower than the sum of compliance incentives and default penalties under the digital trust regulation, credit risks of financing can be mitigated effectively. In addition, bank incentives are considered in the game model for further discussion of the platform's choice of regulation strategy, and some recommendations are provided for banks to choose partners in loan cooperation.