研究论文

基于多任务委托代理模型的绿色创新管理契约设计

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  • 上海大学 管理学院, 上海 200444
于丽英(1969-), 女, 教授, 博士生导师, 博士,研究方向为知识管理与创新、管理科学等. E-mail: yuliying@shu.edu.cn

收稿日期: 2020-02-11

  网络出版日期: 2023-01-31

基金资助

国家自然科学基金资助项目(11671250)

Design of green innovation management contract based on multi-task principal-agent model

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  • School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China

Received date: 2020-02-11

  Online published: 2023-01-31

摘要

地方政府绿色创新管理的努力水平是影响区域创新发展的直接因素. 首先, 考虑中央政府激励与引导双重职能、地方政府绿色始创新推进与绿色源创新推进二元任务, 构建中央政府与地方政府绿色创新管理的多任务委托代理模型; 其次, 研究了中央政府激励强度与创新氛围系数间的作用关系, 明确了激励强度、创新氛围系数、地方政府努力水平的影响因素; 最后, 结合绿色创新推进的3个阶段, 借助Matlab探究中央政府在不同阶段的激励策略. 研究结果表明: 外部创新氛围对地方政府的支持是有限的, 还必须引入长期的中央政府激励; 只有排除外在不确定性因素、降低创新推进可变成本、控制地方政府风险规避, 才能真正助推地方政府绿色创新管理; 中央政府选择绿色源创新激励的引入时间越准确、引导强度越合适、地方政府创新递进系数分配越合理, 越有利于绿色创新管理契约收益最大化; 在绿色始创新推进阶段, 激励强度随创新边际收益提升而增强; 在绿色始创新带动绿色源创新阶段, 绿色始创新激励强度逐步衰减, 绿色源创新激励强度显著增强; 在绿色源创新重构绿色始创新阶段, 两项激励间分化严重, 绿色创新进程加快.

本文引用格式

刘宏笪, 于丽英 . 基于多任务委托代理模型的绿色创新管理契约设计[J]. 上海大学学报(自然科学版), 2022 , 28(6) : 1051 -1062 . DOI: 10.12066/j.issn.1007-2861.2241

Abstract

The local government's effort in green innovation management directly affects the development of regional innovation. First, considering the dual functions of the central government's incentive and guidance and the local government's task of promoting independent and disruptive innovations, this paper constructs a multi-task principal-agent model between the central and the local governments. Second, this paper studies the relationship between the central government's incentive intensity and the innovation climate coefficient. It clarifies the factors influencing the incentive intensity, innovation climate coefficient, and the local government's effort level. Finally, the central government's incentive strategies are explored using a numerical simulation in the three stages of green innovation management. The results show that: support for local governments from external innovation is limited, and long-term central government incentives must be introduced. By eliminating external uncertainties, reducing the variable cost of innovation promotion, and controlling local governments' risk aversion, the local government can genuinely boost green innovation management. The more accurate the introduction time of the central government's choice of green disruptive innovation incentives, the more conducive it is to the maximization of green innovation management contract revenue. In the green independent innovation promotion stage, the incentive intensity increases as the marginal profit of innovation increases. In the green independent innovation driving green disruptive innovation stage, the incentive intensity of green independent innovation gradually decreases, and that of green disruptive innovation significantly increases. In the green disruptive innovation reconstructing green independent innovation stage, the differentiation between the two incentives is profound, and the process of green innovation is accelerated.

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