以重大工程协同技术创新激励问题为研究重点, 在委托代理框架下引入公平偏好理论, 分别探讨了业主方和代理方均有公平偏好、双方公平中性、代理方有公平偏好、业主方有公平偏好的情形下, 公平心理对激励机制设计的影响. 研究结果表明: 当双方公平偏好强度不相等时, 最优激励系数与代理方公平偏好正相关, 与业主方公平偏好负相关; 当双方公平偏好强度相等时, 固定支付随偏好强度负向变动, 而产出贡献率的相对大小会改变公平偏好对激励系数的影响方向, 最终表现为产出分享比例随公平偏好的增强 逐渐向产出贡献率较低的一方倾斜, 但不会超过 0.5. 通过数值模拟发现, 双方公平偏好强度的差异有利于业主方效用水平的提升, 但差异过大会影响创新联盟的总体利润.

This study focuses on the incentive mechanism of collaborative technology innovation of mega projects. To analyse the impact of fairness preference on the design of incentive mechanism, this study discusses four situations based on the principal-agent theory: both sides have fairness preference, both sides are self-interested, the agent has fairness preference, and the owner has fairness preference. The results reveal that when the fairness preference of the two sides is not equal, the optimal incentive coefficient is positively correlated with the agent's fairness preference, while negatively correlated with that of the owner. When the fairness preference of the two sides is equal, the fixed payment changes negatively with the fairness preference, and the output contribution rate changes the influence of fairness preference on the incentive coefficient. The final performance is that the output sharing proportion obtained by the side with the lower contribution rate is positively correlated to fairness preference, but not more than 0.5. The numerical modelling shows that the gap between two sides' fairness preference is beneficial to the improvement of the owner's utility, but a wide gap is unfavorable to the total profit.