地下综合管廊是智慧城市发展的重要物质基础, 综合管廊的质量和安全直接影响智慧城市的韧性. 由于综合管廊施工技术复杂、利益主体多元, 各主体间存在信息不对称现象, 总承包商在施工中存在机会主义行为. 为提高综合管廊项目的监管效率, 基于前景理论和演化博弈理论, 构建了智慧城市地下综合管廊监管模型, 研究了影响政府及总承包商策略选择的主要因素. 考虑到惩罚规制对机会主义行为抑制作用的局限性, 进一步构建了政府激励规制模型, 分析了总承包商不同风险态度下, 激励规制对机会主义行为的作用机理. 结果表明: 总承包商的机会主义行为与安全管理成本和违规收益正相关, 与事故损失及惩罚负相关; 政府激励规制效果受到总承包商不同风险偏好的影响; 惩罚规制和激励规制具有互补效应, 可同时作用于监管系统.

Underground utility tunnels are important bases for the development of smart cities. The quality and safety of utility tunnels directly affect the resilience of smart cities. Owing to the complex construction technology involved in building utility tunnels, multiple stakeholders, and asymmetric information, the general contractor can behave opportunistically. To improve supervision efficiency in utility tunnel projects, a supervision model based on prospect theory and evolutionary game theory was developed, and the main factors influencing government and general contractors' strategy choices were investigated. Given the limitation of punishment mechanisms in the prevention of opportunistic behaviours, a government incentive regulation model was further established, and the action mechanism of incentives on opportunistic behaviours under different risk attitudes of the contractors was analysed. The results indicated that the opportunistic behaviours of the general contractor were positively related to safe management, costs, and illegal income and negatively related to accident loss and punishment. The effect of government incentive regulation was influenced by the different risk preferences of general contractors. Punishment and incentive regulations were complementary.