旨在探讨信息披露如何约束上市公司, 为解释以前文献的争议提供思路. 通过建立不同类型企业在融资过程中的博弈模型, 考虑专业投资者的比例, 对该模型中纯战略 Nash 均衡和混合战略 Nash 均衡展开分析, 以揭示信息披露如何在保障资本市场正常运作中不可或缺. 研究表明, 懂得依据公司质量进行投资的专业投资者比例越小, 强制信息披露带来的社会总收益增加越大; 特别地, 当专业投资者小于一定比例时, 强制信息披露是维持市场稳定的必要机制, 能有效避免市场的失灵. 强制信息披露带来的社会总收益增加在以下情况中更大: 投资回报率差异显著, 投资规模较大, 融资成本较高, 市场对于不披露信息惩罚较大.

This study explores the mechanism of corporate disclosure governing corporate decisions andin doing so, explains the mixed evidence observed in previous literature. By establishing game theory models of corporate finance and considering the percentage of professional investorsin a company, this study analyses pure strategy Nash equilibrium and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.It also reveals how information disclosure is indispensable in ensuring the smooth operation of capital markets. The study finds that a smaller proportion of professional investors is associated with greater total social benefit as a result of mandatory corporate disclosure. When the proportion of professional investors is below a certain threshold, mandatory disclosure is necessary to maintain market stability and avoid market failure. Compulsory disclosure causes a greater increase in total social benefit in the following cases: significant differences in return on investment, a larger investment scale, higher financing costs, and a greater non-disclosure penalty.