Analysis of stability of “The Belt and Road” PPP infrastructure projects cooperation based on evolutionary game
Received date: 2018-06-19
Online published: 2019-09-04
PPP(public-private-partnership) 基础设施合作的稳定性会直接影响 公共部门和社会资本的收益. 基于“一带一路” PPP 基础设施系统的复杂性和利益主体的多元性, 利用演化博弈理论, 构建东道国政府、我国企业、公众的三方演化博弈模型, 分析影响 PPP 项目合作稳定性的主要因素, 并运用 Matlab 对案例工程进行数值仿真. 研究结果表明, 较高的项目预期投资收益、招投标阶段有效的成本控制、东道国政府提供的合理 政策支持、PPP 基础设施项目国际关注度的提高, 以及东道国政府和我国企业所给予公 众的社会福利和优惠的适当减少, 都能增强基础设施项目的合作稳定性.
马光红, 鲍铖奕, 单而芳 . 基于演化博弈的“一带一路”PPP 基础设施合作稳定性分析[J]. 上海大学学报(自然科学版), 2019 , 25(4) : 612 -624 . DOI: 10.12066/j.issn.1007-2861.2077
Stability of PPP (public-private-parternship) infrastructure cooperation directly affects benefits of public sector and social capital. Based on the complexity of PPP infrastructure system and diversity of stakeholders of “The Belt and Road”, evolution game theory is used to build a tripartite model of host government, Chinese enterprises and local public to analyze the main factors influencing cooperation stability of PPP projects. Moreover, the evolution path and numerical simulation of infrastructure projects are carried on with Matlab. Research results show that the cooperation stability of PPP infrastructure projects can be improved by a higher expected investment income, effectively controlling bidding costs, strengthening the policy support from the host government, increasing international attention of PPP infrastructure and appropriately reducing social welfare and benefits to the public by host government and Chinese enterprises.
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